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1. Introduction
This paper addresses a sector-specific regulatory struc-
ture, namely legislation reducing the number of work-
ing hours per day or per week and, in order to achieve
this aim, referring to collective agreements. The laws
discussed in this paper make the application of the law
dependent on the existence and contents of collective
agreements, or leave the concretization of the law to
collective agreements, or give them power to derogate
from the law. This wide-spread form of public–private
regulation emerged right after the end of the First World
War and is a dominant feature of labour law in France
and Belgium to the present day. Taking up the questions
outlined in the introduction, this article will discuss how
such hybrids were legitimized in the interwar period.
The problem of legitimization of public–private reg-
ulation can be resumed, in this specific case, briefly as
follows: Parliamentary democracy acknowledges parlia-
ment as the only body representing the will of the na-
tion. Decisions aremade bymajority; laws apply to every-
one. Norm-setting through administrative rulings is only
legitimate (and legal) as far as the law, passed by parlia-
ment, permits. When workers’ collective action was le-
galized in France and Belgium, trade unions demanded
to fix the rules of the trade, negotiating wages and work-
ing conditions with employers and their associations.
At the outbreak of the war, such collective agreements
were widely accepted as legitimate, but their legal sta-
tus was still under debate. In Belgium, collective agree-
ments were not considered legally binding, representing
no more than a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’. In France, but
also in Germany and other countries, they were consid-
ered to be contracts, binding only upon the parties of the
contract. The French law on collective agreements of 25
March 1919 confirmed this doctrine. Consequently, the
idea that trade unions and employers’ associations could
set norms binding on every member of the trade, their
agreements enjoying, within this professional space, the
same universal authority as a law, was highly controver-
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sial. Practical experience had, however, shown that col-
lective agreements inmany cases could onlywork and be
enforced, if every employer and worker, whether mem-
ber of a union or not, was bound to respect the wages
and working conditions laid down in the collective agree-
ment.Making the parties to collective agreements partic-
ipate in generating and implementing laws on the reduc-
tion of working hours was thus an experiment combining
the universality of rules set by the state with the negoti-
ation of private contracts.
At first glance, it might seem obvious that such a new,
experimental form of public–private regulation of labour
on a national scale would stand in need of legitimization.
However, when analysing the debates following the laws
on the 8-hour day in the after war period, and those sur-
rounding the laws on the 40-hour week in 1936, we find
an apparently much higher need for legitimization of reg-
ulation on the French side, concerning the 1919 law, and
a much more intense debate on the Belgian side in the
thirties. Our question of how this type of public–private
regulation was legitimized, thus leads us to ask in which
specific historical contexts a need for legitimization was
perceived, and by whom.
As different ways to combine legislative, adminis-
trative, and contractual regulation were developed in
France (Fridenson, 2004) and Belgium, we expect to ob-
serve different patterns of legitimization. We must, how-
ever, take into account that the discourses we analyse do
not always reflect the specific regulatory arrangement
made by the law in question. In fact, authors refer to
these laws, but follow a logic of their own and may pur-
sue political aims only loosely connected to the laws they
are pretending to legitimate. Because of the possible gap
between the actual public policy implemented and the
discourse, it will be necessary to give a detailed presen-
tation of the laws and administrative practises before
analysing legitimization discourses.
The first section of the paper will give a brief account
of the historical context of the laws on the 8-hour day,
present the specific regulatory arrangements in France
and Belgium, and discuss which criteria and sources of
legitimacy permitted the legislation on the reduction of
working hours to pass parliament. The second section will
analyse the dominant French discourses on the coopera-
tion between the state and organized capital and labour in
producing and implementing labour law. These discourses
strongly favour output related arguments to legitimate
this cooperation, vaunting it as a first step towards a tech-
nocratic form of norm-setting in France. The third section
will, again, briefly present the historical context and the
content of the laws on the 40-hour week, before show-
ing how Belgian discourses legitimizing the labour laws
of 1936 went on to promote larger corporatist projects
of state reform. The paper thus focuses on two points
in time: the immediate post-war period, and 1936, when
both countries knew a period of social unrest and intense
debate of labour legislation, the French legislation exert-
ing a strong influence on the Belgian labour movement.
2. The Law on the 8-Hour Day
In both countries, labour legislation before 1914 met
with many obstacles. Bills aiming at introducing shorter
working days or compulsory social insurance failed in par-
liament or were delayed for years; more than once, court
rulings rendered labour laws inoperable. This lack of sup-
port demonstrates that, while workers and their organi-
zations were clamouring for laws reducing working time,
state intervention into the working conditions of adult
men, which would have limited the ‘liberté du travail’ of
employers and workers, was not considered legitimate
by a considerable part of the political and academic elite.
If ‘legitimacy is indicated by actor’s compliance with…a
set of social obligations’, (Johnson, Dowd, & Ridgeway,
2006, p. 55), labour legislation’s legitimacy was low in
the eyes of French employers, too. Lawmakers and ad-
ministrators struggled to devise regulations universal in
scope, but sufficiently flexible to adapt to the needs
of various industries, without on the other hand being
too complex to allow for verification by state inspectors.
Labour legislation was criticized in France for being ei-
ther too schematic or for creating an all-encroaching bu-
reaucracy, when specific regulations adapted to specific
socio-economic situations had to be enforced. In a fa-
mous text published in 1901, Emile Durkheim (1901) de-
scribed this dilemma of state regulation: general and uni-
form labour lawsmust be inefficient, but detailed regula-
tion for each branch of industry would enhance the ten-
dency towards an ‘état hypertrophié’, an excessively de-
veloped state. Therefore, he suggested creating a mod-
ern version of the ancient corporations of masters and
journeymen, able to regulate the different branches of in-
dustry, and to devolve part of the state’s norm—setting
power to them, allowing them to produce ‘la loi de la
profession’. Durkheim considered new corporations, cre-
ated by law, necessary because of what he and many
of his contemporaries perceived as the shortcomings of
French trade unions: they did not organize the majority
of workers and were thus not deemed ‘representative’.
Consequently, trade unions and employers’ associations
lacked democratic legitimacy for setting norms binding
upon all employers and workers of a given branch of in-
dustry (Rudischhauser, 2016, pp. 810–814).
During the war, however, the French state called
upon leaders of trade unions and employers’ associa-
tions to sit upon a great number of tripartite commis-
sions and bodies set up by the state, where they ‘repre-
sented’ workers’ and employers’ interests in dealingwith
social and economic problems, from unemployment to
women’s work to wage-setting. The state thus acknowl-
edged trade unions and employers’ associations and de-
clared their collaboration to be indispensable in organiz-
ing the war economy. Through this collaboration with
the government, the organizations gained a new legit-
imacy. Trade unions in France, as in other allied coun-
tries, now claimed a role in the post-war national and in-
ternational order, too. At the International Trade Union
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Conference in Leeds in 1916, delegates from the trade
unions of Belgium, Italy, France, and the UK drew up
a program of workers’ rights to be incorporated in the
future peace treaty. This program included a reduction
of working hours and the establishment of an interna-
tional labour office. When peace negotiations opened
in Paris in January 1919, a commission on international
labour legislation was set up to prepare the relevant ar-
ticles of the treaty, presided over by a trade unionist.
Its final report on 4 March recommended the adoption
of the 8-hour day. Manifestly, labour legislation, espe-
cially the reduction of working hours, had become amat-
ter for international treaties as well as for trade union-
ists and employers’ organizations to decide upon. They
were no longer merely consulted. The Versailles Treaty
laid the foundations of the International Labour Organi-
zation (ILO), whose constitution rested on the principle
of tripartism: delegates of national governments (two for
each government) and of a nation’s ‘most representative’
trade unions and employers’ associations (one delegate
each) were to discuss and decide together. The ILO rep-
resented a new normative order based on the collabo-
ration of delegates from national governments, capital,
and labour for the purpose of norm-setting (Rodgers, Lee,
Swepston, & Van Daele, 2009). Legislation introducing
the 8-hour day was part of the Versailles Treaty (Art. 427)
and the object of theWashington convention, its ratifica-
tion a chief aim of the ILO.
These developments put the French government un-
der intense pressure. The 8-hour day had been accepted
as ‘the standard to be aimed at’ (Ramm, 1986, p. 107) by
the allies and had already been proclaimed in Germany.
Not least because of the hopes and emotions raised by
the Bolshevist Revolution, the French government was
afraid of revolutionary strikes and street protests, and
thus it tried to immediately appease some of the work-
ers’ expectations. Looking for a quick solution, it decided
against normal parliamentary procedure, which in the
past had often delayed labour legislation for years on
end. Implicating trade unions’ and employers’ represen-
tatives in the making of the law was a must, if the po-
litical aim of this legislation, social peace, was to be
reached. The government therefore asked the Commis-
sion Interministerielle des Traités Internationaux du Tra-
vail to discuss the 8-hour day, one of the many ‘mixed’
commissions where state and non-state actors collabo-
rated (Oualid & Picquenard, 1928, p. 321). Here, Charles
Picquenard, a top-level public servant at the Ministry of
Labour, proposed a two tier system: The principle of the
8-hour day was to be proclaimed by law, the details and
modes of application were to be determined by adminis-
trative rulings based on collective agreements. The Con-
seil d’Etat, who was to establish the administrative rul-
ings,would not be bound to reproduce the content of the
collective agreement in question, but would only have to
take it into consideration.
Picquenard’s system was essential to make the em-
ployers’ representatives accept the 8-hour day. The Com-
mission adopted the text, containing only four articles,
on 7 April, the government introduced the bill on 8
April, and the Chamber (the Lower House of Parliament)
adopted it on 17 April and the Senate (the Upper House)
on 23 April, both times unanimously. This consensus
and rapidity cannot be explained by the pressure of the
workers’ movements alone. More important was the
fact that delegates of workers’ and employers’ organiza-
tions, considered as legitimate representatives, had al-
ready agreed on this solution. The logic of the 8-hour
day law—gaining legitimacy for state regulation by inte-
grating those directly concerned into the norm-setting
process—was already at work in the making of the law.
Given the context, it might seem plausible to argue
that this type of public–private regulation relied mainly
on input legitimacy enhanced through the participation
of stake-holders in decision-making processes (Scharpf,
1998). However, a closer look at the debates in parlia-
ment raises doubts about whether this was the argu-
ment that permitted the law to pass. In March 1919 the
Senate, the upper house of the French parliament, re-
fused to accept an amendment to the law on collective
agreements. This amendment would have given the pre-
fects, the government appointed heads of the regional
administrations, power to extend a collective agreement
to all employers and workers concerned. The Senate was
not prepared to let a prefect turn a collective agreement
into a kind of administrative ruling, commanding univer-
sal authority. Only four weeks later, the bill on the 8-hour
day was accepted, which enabled the Conseil d’Etat to
give legal and universal force to a collective agreement
by transferring its contents into an administrative ruling.
This change of the Senate’s attitude is striking, espe-
cially since the rapporteur, speaking in favour of the law,
and the main speaker answering, were the same both
times. Therewas no difference as to the qualification and
legitimacy of collective agreements and the negotiating
parties, on which the 8-hour day law was mostly silent.
The difference lay in the nature of the state actor and
the scope of his prerogatives. The prefect, being an in-
strument of the respective government, did not provide
guarantees to employers, whereas the Conseil d’Etat,
being an independent judiciary body, did. Functioning
also as an administrative court, it was credited with de-
fending individual rights like ‘liberté du travail’ against
government interventions. Most importantly, the rela-
tion between the exercise of state authority and the au-
thority of the private contract was different. Whereas
the prefect would have extended the collective agree-
ment as such, having no power to change its content,
the Conseil d’Etat, when drafting the administrative rul-
ing, retained the upper hand, being only obliged to refer
to the collective agreement. The legitimacy of the reg-
ulatory regime rested on the legitimacy of the Conseil
d’Etat, whose source was not democracy, but judicial in-
dependence and juridical expertise. The Senators, and
especially the powerful industrialists and conservative
lawyers who dominated these debates, were firmly re-
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solved to enclose the new form of public–private regula-
tion within the older, established forms of norm-setting,
which had guaranteed their influence on the decision-
making process so far (Rudischhauser, 2016, p. 687f.).
Our argument will become clearer as we consider
the Belgian regulatory arrangement. In Belgium, in April
1919, the government installed joint committees (‘Com-
missions paritaires’), where trade unions and employ-
ers’ associations were equally represented, calling them
‘study commissions’ (Commission d’Études pour la Réduc-
tion de la Durée du Travail dans les Usines Sidérurgiques;
Commission d’Études pour la Réduction de la Durée du
Travail dans les Mines, etc.), charged to study ways and
means to reduce the length of the working day. In fact,
they negotiated collective agreements on working con-
ditions and wages. (Neuville, 1976) The Belgian mode
of labour regulation resembled the one practised in
Britain: the 8-hour day was at first achieved through
(state-sponsored) collective bargaining. When a general
law on the 8-hour day was passed on 14 June 1921,
mostmajor branches had already reached an agreement,
which, as in Britain, was not legally binding but neverthe-
less widely respected. The law allowed companies to ap-
ply for authorization to exceed the limit of 8 hours per
day respectively 48 hours per week. Authorization could
only be given if a prior agreement had been reached
with the trade unions most representative of the work-
ers employed in the company concerned. The law thus
implicitly recognized trade unions as the legitimate rep-
resentatives of workers and collective agreements as
valid contracts, although neither trade unions, nor col-
lective agreements had a legal status. The 8-hour day law
gave ‘de véritables droits à des organisations dépourvus
d’existence légale’ (Velge, 1934, p. 242). Nevertheless,
there was hardly any debate on the legitimacy of this
regulatory regime in Belgium. The Belgian arrangement
proved profitable for both sides: collective agreements
laid the foundations for state regulation, improving its
legitimacy, while trade unions and employers’ associa-
tions gained importance and legitimacy, not least in the
eyes of their constituencies, as the growth of member-
ship demonstrates.
The implementation of the French law on the 8-
hour day provided a stimulus to collective bargaining,
but it also put trade unions in a much weaker position
than the Belgian law did. At the same time, it sacrificed
one of the major advantages of state regulation, namely
universality. While the law was supposed to offer the
benefit of the 8-hour day to every worker, its applica-
tion was subject to administrative rulings (règlements
d’administration publique), which determined when and
how the 8-hour day would come into force in a spe-
cific ‘profession, industry, trade or professional category’.
These rulings were based, as far as possible, on collec-
tive agreements, of which only some concerned whole
branches of industry, others specific professions. Accord-
ingly, administrative rulings were issued for the metal in-
dustries on 9 September 1920, for hair-dressers on 26Au-
gust 1921, for joiners on 31 December 1921, and so on
(Pic, 1930, pp. 567, 584). Norm concretization and imple-
mentation was a very slow, piecemeal process, depend-
ing on successful negotiations. Trade unions and employ-
ers’ associations could negotiate a choice from a wide
variety of legal possibilities, as the working day was sup-
posed to comport 8 hours on average, the average being
calculated per week, per month, or per quarter of the
year. Besides, temporary as well as permanent deroga-
tions could be agreed upon. But in fact, no state action
was taken without a collective agreement being signed
first. As a result, the last administrative rulings were is-
sued in 1935 (Leray, 1998). Contrary to the Belgian orga-
nizations, which gained legitimacy in the course of the
implementation, French organizations lost creditability
every time the Conseil d’Etat’s ruling departed from the
original collective agreement. The law on the 8-hour day
did not allow trade unions and employers’ associations
to be the best judges of what arrangement was most ap-
propriate for their specific trade or industry. However,
the lawdid not aimat lending collective agreements addi-
tional authority and stability, but rather to help the state
out of the dilemma Durkheim had sketched out.
3. Legitimizing the French Model
Because the 8-hour day was rushed through parliament,
no elaborate legitimization discourses were developed
at the time, and the discourses studied here were elabo-
rated ex post. Shortly after the law on the 8-hour day had
been passed, twomajor articles were published in one of
the leading French political journals, the Revue Politique
et Parlementaire, on the participation of employers’ and
workers’ organizations in the making of laws. Both were
written by jurists who were very influential in the public
sphere of the 1920s and 1930s, and both presented the
8-hour day law as a model for future labour laws.
Paul Grunebaum-Ballin was a top level public servant
and a well-known figure of the left, who had made a
brilliant career at the Conseil d’Etat (Thuillier, 2001) and
acquired experience in collective bargaining as an arbi-
trator in labour conflicts in the navy. The application of
the 8-hour day to the merchant navy in a special law
of 2 August 1919 provided the occasion for his article
(Grunebaum-Ballin, 1920). The application of the law, fol-
lowing the same system as the general law on the 8-
hour day, had been a positive experience for Grunebaum-
Ballin: ‘Le nouveau mécanisme fonctionne parfaitement’
(1920, p. 46). Both sides had rapidly reached an agree-
ment, assisted by ‘technicians’, jurists and administra-
tors. The joint committee had been presided over by
a conseiller d’Etat, who then wrote the report prepar-
ing the administrative ruling. Grunebaum-Ballin praises
this procedure as much quicker than parliamentary de-
liberations, and stresses the “competences” of the par-
ticipants, their professional (= linked to the branch of
industry concerned), juridical, and administrative ex-
pertise. In his article, the expertise and ‘wisdom’ of
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‘the technicians of law’ appears as at least as impor-
tant as the expertise of ‘the professionals’. To him, the
new mode of regulation represents a collaboration be-
tween ‘the political’ and ‘the technical’ within the joint
committees, which he dubs ‘commissions techniques lé-
gislatives’. For the future, he recommended that parlia-
ment state the principles and leave all the rest of le-
gal norm-setting to ‘l’accord collectif des représentants
qualifiés des organisations patronales et ouvrières in-
téressées, à l’ingéniosité et à la sagesse des gouver-
nants, des fonctionnaires, des juristes qui prépareront,
discuteront et signeront les règlements d’administration
publique’ (1920, p. 44).
Grunebaum-Ballin was not so much trying to legit-
imize public–private regulation, as using the law on the
8-hour day to legitimize a reform of the parliamentary
system, a constitutional reform. Criticism of parliament
was key, and not, as with Durkheim, criticism of bu-
reaucracy or the welfare state. Grunebaum-Ballin relates
his very negative experience of parliamentary proceed-
ings, where perfectly well-prepared and carefully drafted
projects (in this instance, the Code du travail maritime),
approved by everybody concerned, were stuck and could
not be discussed and passed.1 This is why he advocates
the procedure established in the 8-hour day laws as a
new, much more efficient method of legislation. To le-
gitimize this new method, he likens the sovereign par-
liament to the absolute monarchy, abandoning a part
of its prerogatives at the beginning of the 1789 rev-
olution. He quotes Saint-Simon and Proudhon, imagin-
ing the rule of contract replacing the rule of law, eco-
nomic forces replacing political authorities, functional
categories—agriculture, industry, commerce—replacing
classes. Following the theses advanced by Léon Duguit,
Grunebaum-Ballin suggests abandoning the notion of
the sovereign state, putting the idea of social service, run
by public servants, in its place. In doing so, he argues no
longer in favour of Proudhon’s rule of contract, but in
favour of a rule of technicians: Technocracy. Grunebaum-
Ballin’s argument implied that lawmaking could be de-
politicized, reduced to technical instead of political deci-
sions. As far as he was concerned with the legitimacy of
the mode of regulation established through the 8-hour
day laws, it rested on the improved quality of legal norms.
A similar pattern of legitimization can be found in the
writings of Georges Scelle, a socialist and jurist, better
known for his later work on international law. At the time
of his article, he taught labour law in Dijon; in 1924, he
would become chef de cabinet of the minister of labour,
Justin Godart, one of the ‘fathers’ of the law on the 8-
hour day in 1919. Scelle’s article, as Grunebaum-Ballin’s,
places the accent on legislative techniques and meth-
ods (Scelle, 1920). His starting point is the debate on
sources and authors of law, the question of whether law
is necessarily a product of parliament. To Scelle, there
are other ways of producing law, namely what he calls
‘autonomous’ law, negotiated between employers and
workers. Such a negotiated, contractual law, ‘la loi con-
ventionelle, acceptée et non imposée’ (Scelle, 1920, p. 29)
has a better chance of being obeyed, will be a better in-
formed and more objective law, taking into account all
opinions and interests. In later studies, Scelle would call
the lawon the 8-hour day itself a ‘kind of collective agree-
ment’, because it had been negotiated and agreed upon
between employers’ and workers’ representatives in a
tripartite commission (Scelle, 1927, p. 208). This notion
of a ‘contractual law’ is linked to an idea of industrial
democracy, replacing the ‘monarchy’ of the employer.
Scelle thus represents collective agreements as the ‘true’
labour laws.
Just as Grunebaum-Ballin, Scelle is very critical of par-
liamentary methods. Laws voted in parliament are al-
ways too late, and incompetent. Parliament should there-
fore only state the general principles and create the
framework to facilitate and stimulate collective bargain-
ing, that is, the ‘secondary’, ‘contractual’, true labour law.
Scelle elaborates this distinction between ‘primary’ and
‘secondary’ legislation in his later textbooks on labour
law. In his 1927 Précis Élémentaire de Législation Indus-
trielle, Scelle, contrary to Grunebaum-Ballin, does not
credit the Conseil d’Etatwith a technical competence. He
limits its role to a control of legality; its main function is
to confer obligatory force to a contractual arrangement
that would otherwise be binding only to the members of
the contracting organizations. Scelle does not consider
the Conseil d’Etat as the guardian of general interest. He
glosses over the fact that legally the Conseil d’Etat is not
bound to accept the text of the collective agreement and
does not mention the instances when the Conseil d’Etat
had, in fact, not done so. This distortion of the role of the
Conseil d’Etat enables Scelle to present the 8-hour day
law as a step ‘towards the autonomy of the regulation
of labour’.
But this ‘autonomous legislation’ is legitimated exclu-
sively by its results, its higher quality, due to the compe-
tence of workers and employers, and its inherent flexi-
bility. Scelle is convinced that the new legislative tech-
nique will make the modification of legal norms easier
when economic situations change, assuming that col-
lective bargaining is always quicker than parliamentary
procedure (Scelle, 1922, p. 107), which is obviously not
true in the case of the 8-hour day. In his argument, ‘au-
tonomy’ designates only the ‘spontaneous’ emergence
of this kind of law, as opposed to parliamentary law.
Nowhere does Scelle mention or reflect upon a right to
self-regulation or the existence of an autonomous nor-
mative sphere. Consequently, he does not reflect on the
legitimacy of the existing trade unions and employers’ as-
sociations to set norms which will become compulsory
even for outsiders. Scelle and Grunebaum-Ballin’s cen-
tral legitimation topoi are expert knowledge and compe-
tence, which Grunebaum-Ballin locates with the top ad-
ministration, especially the Conseil d’Etat, Scelle with the
employers’ and workers’ organizations.
1 Grunebaum-Ballin’s real aim was to get ‘his’ Code du Travail Maritime passed. The corresponding law is reproduced in the annex of his article.
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Scelle’s distinction between ‘primary’ and ‘sec-
ondary’ legislation became a kind of official doctrine of
the French Ministry of Labour, whose department of
labour was continuously under the direction of Charles
Picquenard until 1937. Picquenard was proud of the new
legislative technique he had invented. In his eyes, the
main advantage of the 8-hour day lawwas that it allowed
‘the generalization of collective agreements’ (Oualid &
Picquenard, 1928, p. 292), transforming them into norms
binding on everybody working within the branch con-
cerned. The 8-hour day law, in his eyes, compensated for
the Senate’s refusal of the extension of collective agree-
ments. Picquenard considers the new technique as a
means of turning employers’ and workers’ organizations
into second degree lawmakers, into ‘les auxiliaires pro-
fessionnels, techniques ou régionaux du législateur par-
lementaire’, a techniquewhich opens ‘immense horizons’
(Oualid & Picquenard, 1928, p. 295f.). Speaking of a ‘di-
vision of labour’, he adopts Scelle’s formula of a ‘colla-
boration hierarchisée entre le législateur parlementaire
et le législateur autonome’.
French jurists of the left, close to or part of the admin-
istration, were quite satisfied with this ‘autonomy’, while
corporatists on the right of the political spectrum tended
to minimize the importance of this kind of collaboration.
Jean Brèthe de la Gressaye, a well-known Catholic cor-
poratist, highlighted the importance of another law, of
29 December 1923, on the weekly day of rest (Brèthe de
la Gressaye, 1930, pp. 76–92). It gave the prefect power
to order shops to be closed on the day fixed in a corre-
sponding collective agreement. Brèthe considered that
this law, contrary to the one on the 8-hour day, gave real
regulatory power to the organizations of employers and
workers, which they sharedwith the prefect. Because the
prefect could only intervene at their demand and accord-
ing to the rules fixed in the collective agreement, ‘for the
first time, the regulatory authority was at the disposal of
the professional organizations’ (Rivero, 1939, p. 195). But
the only argument Brèthe explicitly offered in favour of
such a hybrid regulation referred to output: a regulation
adapted to the needs of each branch and to local circum-
stances could only be achieved through the collaboration
of the parties concerned.
4. The 40-Hour Week in Belgium: Cautious Corporatists
Just as the introduction of the 8-hour day, the reduction
of the number of hours worked per week to 40 was justi-
fied on social and economic grounds, namely as a means
to fight unemployment. From 1931 onward, an interna-
tional debate on such a reduction of working time en-
gaged legal experts and trade-unionists in Europe, result-
ing in ILO Convention No. 47 of 1935 (Chatriot, 2004).
But only when in 1936 a massive wave of strikes forced
a change of policies did parliaments in France and four
weeks later in Belgium pass a law on the 40-hour week.
The mode of regulation chosen reflected past experi-
ences with the 8-hour day, but also, in the case of Bel-
gium, a broad debate on new mechanisms and organiza-
tions that would enable employers and workers to regu-
late the economy and participate in norm-setting.
The French law on the 40-hour week, passed on 21
June 1936, superficially resembles the 8-hour day law.
Again, a very laconic text was rushed through parliament
in a hurry. Ministerial decrees, one for each branch of
the economy, were to determine how the 40-hour week
would be introduced. Employers’ and workers’ organi-
zations had to be consulted, the decrees had to refer
to collective agreements, if they existed. But this time,
the whole procedure was centralized and organized by
the Ministry of Labour, which consulted the employers’
and workers’ organizations of each branch of the econ-
omy and then handed the dossier to the competent
section of the Conseil national économique, on whose
report it drafted the decree (décrets rendus en conseil
des ministres). The legitimacy of the Conseil national
économique was based on its representative nature, as
only organizations deemed to be ‘the most represen-
tative’ of the branch concerned could designate mem-
bers to the Conseil national économique (Chatriot, 2002,
2007). But the political nature of theMinistry’s decisions
was clearly visible. The negotiations within the sections
of the Conseil national économique produced the techni-
cal advice the ministry was asking for, but did not confer
an additional legitimacy to the application of the 40-hour
week, which was famously criticized for its ‘rigidity’ (Cha-
triot, 2004, p. 84). Its critics did not perceive the law on
the 40-hour week as a continuation of the French model
of secondary lawmaking, but as a return to state regula-
tion. Consequently, its legitimacywasweak in the eyes of
those employers, politicians, and academics, who had al-
ways opposed labour legislation. Authors close to these
circles, at the same time, praised the flexibility of the Bel-
gian law on the 40-hour week.
This law on the 40-hour week, of 9 July 1936 (Re-
vue du Travail, 1936, pp. 783–784), was to be applied
only in industries presenting dangers or health hazards.
Consultation of joint committees or trade unions and
employers’ associations was mandatory. A royal decree
could confer legal force to a joint committee’s decision
(in fact, a collective agreement) and extend it to all em-
ployers and workers working in the branch of industry
concerned. The same provisions are to be found in the
law, passed one day earlier, on paid holidays for work-
ers. The royal decree thus incorporated the content of
a collective agreement, transforming it into imperative
law, to be controlled and enforced by the state inspec-
tion of factories. Contraventions were accordingly pe-
nalized. But—perhaps as a precaution—the joint com-
mittees were still called study commissions, as in 1919:
‘commission d’étude de la réduction de la durée hebdo-
madaire du travail dans les mines de Houille’ etc. (Revue
du Travail, 1937, pp. 709–713).
The 1936 Belgian legislation built on the de facto le-
gitimacy and authority of collective agreements (respec-
tively joint committees), and it did not legislate on collec-
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tive agreements as such, nor give a legal status to the ex-
isting trade unions and employers’ associations. The gov-
ernment did not create the new corporations Durkheim
had once demanded, although the creation of ‘organi-
sations professionnelles’, able to regulate the economy,
had been proclaimed official government policy (Velge,
1937, p. 202) in order ‘to simplify the government’s task
of intervention’. ‘Organisation professionnelle’ was a key-
word in the Belgian debates on public–private regulation
and enjoyed a vague, but broad appeal in the economic
and social crisis of the 1930s. All parts of the political
spectrum were calling for an organized or planned econ-
omy. ‘Organisation professionnelle’ came close to rep-
resenting a kind of consensus, because it appealed to
conservatives and liberals hostile to state intervention
and bureaucracy, to Catholics inspired by the encyclical
Quadragesimo anno, and even to many socialists.
The most elaborate proposals for ‘Organisation pro-
fessionnelle’ were made by Henri Velge, professor of law
at Leuven University, well-known for his corporatist doc-
trines and his campaign for the establishment of a Bel-
gian Conseil d’Etat. In an article published in the ‘Re-
vue du Travail’, the official journal of the Belgian Min-
istry of Labour, in 1937, Velge defends the 1936 laws
as being perfectly constitutional, and he sees the trans-
formation of decisions made by workers and employers’
organizations into decrees as a model to be followed
and generalized (Velge, 1937). He wants to maintain the
prerogatives of the state but turn labour organizations
into collaborators of government and parliament. Gov-
ernment should retain the final decision in order to de-
fend the general interest of the nation. But the initiative
should rest with the organizations, whose regulations
could then be transformed into royal decrees. According
to Velge’s conception, workers and employers’ organiza-
tions were not limited to the concretization and applica-
tion of a law passed in parliament. While the executive
was given power to rule by decree, listening to the ini-
tiatives and demands of economic organizations, parlia-
ment’s role was weakened.
Anti-parliamentarism was an important factor in the
debates on public–private regulation. The Belgian de-
bate of the 1930s no longer turned around the question
of how to pass labour legislation quickly and improve its
quality, but aimed at a constitutional reform. In 1937, a
study-commission for the reform of the state (Commis-
sion d’Études pour la Réforme de l’Etat [CERE]), adopted
and generalized Velge’s conception: any kind of profes-
sional regulation could be turned, by royal decree, into
a legal obligation for all employers and workers work-
ing in the branch of industry concerned. Anybody con-
cerned could oppose such a move, appealing to a spe-
cial court, which would decide whether the regulation
was contrary to the constitution, the laws, or the general
interest (Revue du Travail, 1937, pp. 1854–1868). The
Belgian government introduced a bill in 1938, based on
Velge’s project and the proposals of the CERE. ‘Every joint
committee…may solicit that a collective agreement be
transformed into a professional regulation and extended
to all producers, distributers and workers belonging to
the same branch of industry, agriculture, or commerce….’
(Vleeschauwer, 1950, pp. 83–174). All these proposals in-
cluded provisions about the legal status of trade unions
and employers associations, but also created additional
legal bodies on top of the private organizations. The pro-
posals refrained from giving private organizations out-
right regulatory authority and took a lot of precautions
to safeguard the authority of the government.
The same caution pervades the legitimization dis-
courses developed. The main argument was, as it had
been in France, quality of output. Legal regulation was
denounced as incomplete and faulty, because the gov-
ernment lacked the information and expertise, due to
the problems of state intervention in a complex society.
The collaboration of actors working in the branch of in-
dustry concerned was thus necessary to unburden the
state: ‘public authorities must discharge themselves of
a mission they can no longer fulfil’ (Velge, 1942, p. 19).
This criticism of state intervention as such added to the
widespread criticism of parliament, whose legislation, es-
pecially on labour, was shown to be ill-prepared, hasty,
and uncoordinated.
But behind this well-established pattern of legitimiza-
tion, authors like Velge harboured ideas for a new society
in which everybody was consciously part of a group, the
‘profession’. To develop the ‘organisations profession-
nelles’ was consequently a value as such to him. Velge,
who knew how highly controversial his vision of a new
society was, stayed silent on the nature of the profession
(which hardcore corporatists treated as a natural group,
like family), and did not give a name to the new organi-
zation he was proposing. Although engaged in Catholic
politics, he did not once refer to sources of legitimacy
like subsidiarity, autonomy, or self-government.
Such general concepts appeared only in the discourses
of the 1950s, when both French and Belgian jurists used
more audacious terms. In a comprehensive volume on ‘or-
ganisation professionelle’, Robert Vleeschauwer, profes-
sor of law at Leuven University, proclaimed subsidiarity
as the principle of regulation corresponding to natural law.
In France, Paul Durand, in the first volume of his authorita-
tive treatise on labour law, talked about the spontaneous
formation of ‘professional law’, quoting Scelle, Sinzheimer,
and Ihering. He still used the established reference to the
shortcomings of ‘droit étatique’, criticized as incomplete
and rigid, ‘unable to adapt to the divers and changing
forms of social life’. But the next sentence acknowledged
a claim of non-state actors to self-regulation: ‘Every group
aspires to exert a regulatory power. Corporative law de-
velops spontaneously, which completes and even corrects
the legal rule.’ (Durand, 1950, p. 124).
5. Conclusion
Legitimization discourses of labour legislation between
the wars in France and Belgium had a common point of
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departure: a perceived crisis of state regulation. New hy-
brid modes of norm-setting in Belgium rested on the ex-
perience that trade unions and employers’ associations
could and would arrive at collective agreements, set-
ting the rules for their respective trade. This mode of
regulation was widely considered legitimate, but lacked
a legal framework, which may explain why legal schol-
ars hesitated to elaborate on its normative foundations.
The construction of this legal framework proved diffi-
cult still in 1936/37, although the transformation of col-
lective agreements into administrative rulings no longer
met with opposition. While the law on the 8-hour day
had bolstered the legitimacy of collective agreements,
the proponents of ‘organisation professionnelle’ in the
1930s were mainly intent on increasing the power of the
executive, side-stepping parliament. In France, the law
on the 8-hour day had already limited the role of parlia-
ment and given considerable power to the administra-
tion and the supreme administrative court, the Conseil
d’Etat. The law established the Conseil d’Etat as the de-
fender of the common interest, free to set aside the will
of the concerned workers and employers as expressed
in their collective agreement. In 1936, the law on the 40-
hour week made agreements reached between employ-
ers’ and workers’ representatives within the sections of
the Conseil national économique part of a procedure so
closely organized and dominated by the government that
these agreements could not be represented as free pri-
vate contracts. The mode of regulation chosen for the
concretization of the 40-hour week thus did not gain
legitimacy.
Delegitimizing parliament proved to be a key element
for legitimizing public–private collaboration in the mak-
ing and application of labour laws in the interwar pe-
riod. In both France and Belgium, parliament was reg-
ularly depicted as overburdened and incompetent. The
discourses analysed in this paper followed the logic of
Durkheim’s argument, calling for hybrid regulation in or-
der to discharge parliament. The legitimacy of hybrid
regulation was thus mainly derived from the needs and
shortcomings of the state, and from the epistemic au-
thority of non-state actors. Other sources of legitimacy,
like autonomy or self-regulation, were hardly referred to.
Only after the SecondWorldWar, when trade unions had
gained considerable prestige and political weight, was
the claim of trade unions to participate in norm-setting
recognized as legitimate.
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